Judiciary interpreters have not been exposed to these two mutually exclusive and contradictory paths to ethical conduct. We have only been exposed to one: normative ethics. It seems quite an incongruent path to follow in a setting intended to provide every individual with equal access to justice, which is a consequence of due process principles in common law systems. So what does it really mean to provide equal access to justice when it must be mediated through meaningful language access? How is that accomplished?
John Stuart Mills, an English philosopher, brought the principle of
beneficence into the debate between the normative and consequentialist ethics proponents. He argued that incompatible theories can be “coherently unified by a single standard of beneficence that allows us to decide objectively what is right and wrong” (SEP). Mills proposed a
utilitarian approach to ethics that always sought the best possible outcome; in that sense, it was consequentialist. For Immanuel Kant, however, the motive behind a benevolent action must be duty, and every person has a duty to be benevolent, which is the essence of beneficence. Now, even though philosophers could not agree on the boundaries of this moral obligation, they did share some common ground: “the general goal of morality is to minimize the causation of evil or harm” (SEP).
If being moral, being ethical, means that the motivation for our actions is always to minimize—or perhaps eliminate—any harm, then we have to consider whether our current code of ethics meets this objective. We need to ask ourselves: is our practice, as currently guided by the norms and standards for judiciary interpreters and translators, causing any harm to the LEPs who rely on us? Of course, we would first need to define
harm. I would suggest that we cause harm when we fail to provide equal access to justice through meaningful language access.
These questions, as well as many others related to our moral compass in our professional lives, require honest introspection and careful analysis of the work we do. They have not been asked before, so they will not be easy to answer. The historical parameters we have been given have been speculative at best. For example,
if the LEPs cannot understand, they can ask. Experience has taught us that they rarely exercise this level of autonomy in a courtroom.
The LEP should hear and understand the same thing that an English speaker hears and understands. This parameter fails to take into account the structural differences in LEPs' and English speakers’ education, social exposure to the U.S. legal system, and other important components of culture-bound upbringings that cannot be overcome by simply transforming English discourse into some other language. It also overlooks the limitations imposed by the physical courtroom environment, where LEPs receive asynchronous information with often incomplete paralinguistic discursive constituents. None of these variables have been studied in U.S. courts and remain impressionistic justifications for a code of conduct that continues to be taught to and adopted by judiciary interpreters with no critical analysis or oversight.
Whereas interpreters and translators in other domains have already addressed many of these questions within the demands of their specializations, judiciary interpreters and translators have not. I am convinced that our complacency with the current state of affairs regarding our code of ethics is, in many instances, breaching the very ethical principles and moral duties judiciary interpreters and translators are obligated to uphold. We urgently need a representative body of professionals in our field who can commit to creating an intellectually objective and morally justifiable revised code of ethics.
Consider this a call for volunteers.
jpalma@najit.org