Why Ethics?

November 19, 2026

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For those who have encountered similar situations:


What would you have done?

Should she have proceeded immediately? Should she have declined? Or should she have paused, advised the court that she had been retained by one party, explained the accuracy concerns, or asked the judge how to proceed?


Would that have been the most transparent course? Or would it have unnecessarily suggested that she could not remain neutral?


Thank you to this week's Couch contributor!

Why Ethics?

By: Janis Palma, PhD

Most interpreters and translators I have met take ethics for granted. There’s a code; we follow it, and that’s all there is to it. But is it? Ethics is a field of inquiry and scholarship that can be traced back to Ancient Greece, and it has evolved and expanded into many disciplines. Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle contributed ideas about ethics that were linked to justice. In Gorgias, one of Socrates’ famous dialogues, written around 380 BC, he argued that it was better to suffer injustice than to do it. Plato and Aristotle viewed ethics in terms of virtue and how it applied to “a well-lived life” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP)). Ethics has remained a dynamic and much-debated concept since then, which means it cannot be understood as unchangeable or monolithic.

Traditionally, ethics has been the study of right and wrong, good and bad. But those attributes can have different definitions at different times and under different circumstances. This is why ethics cannot be a set of immovable rules. Instead, we must ask ourselves what makes our actions or decisions just or unjust, what values guide our professional conduct and the choices we make, and what duties we owe those for whom we interpret or translate.


Interpreters and translators seldom think about the duty we owe to the people for whom we interpret or translate, particularly in the legal domain. And those who do often think only of the English speakers, convinced that our duty is to the judge or the court as an abstraction, but seldom, if ever, to the Limited English Proficient (LEP). This is the debris left behind after decades of conditioning to think of ethics as a set of rules rather than a decision-making process grounded in moral judgment. 


As the philosophical definitions of ethics moved back and forth between serving one’s best interests and serving those of others, one principle that remained constant was the Golden Rule, which Samuel Clark redefined in the 17th century with a more secular application: “Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable for another to do for me, that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I in the like case should do for him” (Britannica). Were we the ones needing an interpreter during a legal proceeding in a strange country and in a language we do not understand, how would we want that interpreter to convey what we have to say and what we hear but cannot possibly know what it means?


Fast-forward to the 20th century, when John Rawls wrote A Theory of Justice, considered the “most influential work on ethics by an American philosopher” (Britannica). He proposed that we would always make the fairest ethical decisions if the only information we had was how they would affect our own lives but not the lives of others. It was another way of saying “do unto others…” But that also sparked debate among philosophers about the ethical choices we make: do we act out of selfish interests or out of a sense of duty toward others? This evolved into two main theories guiding ethical conduct: normative or consequentialist. 


As the names suggest, normative ethics (also known as deontological) imposes a set of norms or standards, whereas consequential ethics (also known as teleological) looks at the consequences of our actions to determine their morality. For consequentialists, if an action is deemed good according to the norms but the consequences are harmful or detrimental to someone, then it cannot be just and ethical conduct. For the normative thinker, an action is morally good if it follows the prescribed rules, regardless of the consequences. 

Judiciary interpreters have not been exposed to these two mutually exclusive and contradictory paths to ethical conduct. We have only been exposed to one: normative ethics. It seems quite an incongruent path to follow in a setting intended to provide every individual with equal access to justice, which is a consequence of due process principles in common law systems. So what does it really mean to provide equal access to justice when it must be mediated through meaningful language access? How is that accomplished? 


John Stuart Mills, an English philosopher, brought the principle of beneficence into the debate between the normative and consequentialist ethics proponents. He argued that incompatible theories can be “coherently unified by a single standard of beneficence that allows us to decide objectively what is right and wrong” (SEP). Mills proposed a utilitarian approach to ethics that always sought the best possible outcome; in that sense, it was consequentialist. For Immanuel Kant, however, the motive behind a benevolent action must be duty, and every person has a duty to be benevolent, which is the essence of beneficence. Now, even though philosophers could not agree on the boundaries of this moral obligation, they did share some common ground: “the general goal of morality is to minimize the causation of evil or harm” (SEP). 


If being moral, being ethical, means that the motivation for our actions is always to minimize—or perhaps eliminate—any harm, then we have to consider whether our current code of ethics meets this objective. We need to ask ourselves: is our practice, as currently guided by the norms and standards for judiciary interpreters and translators, causing any harm to the LEPs who rely on us? Of course, we would first need to define harm. I would suggest that we cause harm when we fail to provide equal access to justice through meaningful language access. 


These questions, as well as many others related to our moral compass in our professional lives, require honest introspection and careful analysis of the work we do. They have not been asked before, so they will not be easy to answer. The historical parameters we have been given have been speculative at best. For example, if the LEPs cannot understand, they can ask. Experience has taught us that they rarely exercise this level of autonomy in a courtroom. The LEP should hear and understand the same thing that an English speaker hears and understands. This parameter fails to take into account the structural differences in LEPs' and English speakers’ education, social exposure to the U.S. legal system, and other important components of culture-bound upbringings that cannot be overcome by simply transforming English discourse into some other language. It also overlooks the limitations imposed by the physical courtroom environment, where LEPs receive asynchronous information with often incomplete paralinguistic discursive constituents. None of these variables have been studied in U.S. courts and remain impressionistic justifications for a code of conduct that continues to be taught to and adopted by judiciary interpreters with no critical analysis or oversight.


Whereas interpreters and translators in other domains have already addressed many of these questions within the demands of their specializations, judiciary interpreters and translators have not. I am convinced that our complacency with the current state of affairs regarding our code of ethics is, in many instances, breaching the very ethical principles and moral duties judiciary interpreters and translators are obligated to uphold. We urgently need a representative body of professionals in our field who can commit to creating an intellectually objective and morally justifiable revised code of ethics. 


Consider this a call for volunteers.

jpalma@najit.org 


Keep the Conversation Going


If this topic resonated with you, be sure to check out our previous blog posts for more insights on the realities of our profession, and the evolving world of judiciary translation and interpreting:



It Takes a Village (of Volunteers) — How can professional associations encourage more members to volunteer and take on leadership roles?

The Feedback Matters — Have something to say about a TNO post? Keep sending your thoughts our way. You may see your comment featured in a future reader roundup.  

Let’s Talk About Décalage — How do you determine your ideal décalage during simultaneous interpreting, and what strategies help you maintain it when a speaker’s pace or sentence structure becomes challenging?

The Couch: When Impartiality Meets the Scope of an Assignment — An interpreter hired by one party in a contentious civil case faces questions about impartiality, professional obligations, and the scope of her assignment when asked to sight translate lengthy documentary evidence for opposing counsel.


You can find these and more in our blog archives!


Interested in sharing your insights with our community? 

Check out Writing for The NAJIT Observer to learn how you can contribute.


Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position, policies, or views of the NAJIT Board of Directors or the organization as a whole. Content published in The NAJIT Observer is intended to encourage professional dialogue, reflection, and community engagement. Reader discretion is advised where topics may involve complex ethical, professional, or emotionally sensitive subject matter.


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Janis Palma

Guest Contributor


Janis Palma is a professional English-Spanish interpreter and translator with over 43 years of experience working as both a staff member and an independent contractor in state and federal courts, as well as for private clients at conferences on a broad spectrum of topics. She is certified by NAJIT and the U.S. Courts and is a Texas Master licensed interpreter. She holds a Ph.D. in Language Studies, a Master’s in Legal Studies (MLS), and an M.A. in Caribbean History and Literature. Janis Palma has volunteered with the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators (NAJIT) since 1986 and was awarded a Life Membership in 2006. She has presented at conferences, taught, written, and published extensively on subjects related to interpreting, language access, and language rights. Her research interests are mainly focused on the intersection between language, law, and interpreting in legal contexts. She is currently working towards a second PhD in Rhetorics, Communication, and Information Design from Clemson University, where she plans to develop a new line of research into the rhetorics of justice and language access in the United States.

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