Confidential vs Privileged: Is There A Difference?

Janis Palma, PhD • September 11, 2026

Share this article

Confidential vs Privileged: Is There A Difference?

By: Janis Palma, PhD

Canon 3 of the NAJIT Code of Ethics and Professional Responsibility is identified as the confidentiality canon, but the description includes privileged as well as confidential information.

Canon 3. Confidentiality

Privileged or confidential information acquired in the course of interpreting or preparing a translation shall not be disclosed by the interpreter without authorization.

This conflation has caused some anxiety among interpreters who have been on the receiving end of a subpoena by a judge who wants to know what was interpreted during an out-of-court proceeding. Can we disclose confidential information obtained during the course of an interpreting event? Technically, we cannot. Not of our own volition. But if a judge orders that we disclose information of a confidential nature that we interpreted, then we disclose—unless we can’t remember, which is what usually happens after we complete an assignment.

On the other hand, a judge would never ask us to disclose the contents of privileged communication. That is the communication that takes place between an attorney and his or her client. That privilege extends to the interpreter, as long as there is no one else in the room aside from the attorney and the client. The difference between privileged and confidential communication was illustrated quite clearly in an 1859 case: “communications made to attorneys, &c., are protected from disclosure in court, and not because they are confidential. No such protection is given to communications made to the members of any other profession.” Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859). A client needs to trust that his or her attorney will protect all information shared in the interest of representing that client competently and effectively. Therefore, confidential information provided by a client is shrouded in a special privilege, such that “it has become a settled rule of evidence, that the confidential attorney, solicitor or counselor can never be called as a witness to disclose papers committed or communications made to him in that capacity, unless the client himself consents to such disclosure.” Goddard at 175. In that particular case, there was a third party involved in the communication between the attorney and his client, which automatically nullified the privilege, even though the information could still be considered confidential. But had there not been a third party, the appellate court specified that the rule “extends to interpreters, and to clerks and agents employed by the attorney, &c. in the business committed to his charge, but extends no further. Its operation is to exclude material evidence from the consideration of the triers, and it ought not to be extended beyond the reason on which it rests. Goddard at 175. Why material evidence? Because the client is expected to provide his or her attorney with such evidence to prepare a defense, should one be the client’s preferred course of action.

To be clear, no judge may compel the disclosure of privileged communications between counsel and client, and that injunction includes the interpreter. That is, unless the client decides otherwise. The protection against disclosure of attorney-client communications “is the privilege of the client,” and as the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut clarified, “he may renounce or waive it at his pleasure.” Goddard at 175. But only the client can waive or renounce it, not the attorney, and certainly not a judge. An interpreter will never be asked to disclose the contents of privileged communications.


On the other hand, an interpreter may be compelled to disclose the contents of confidential communications, as can attorneys and other parties to a case, except a criminal defendant, of course, because of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Case law can be muddled because it may use privilege and confidentiality as synonyms. For example, in a 1957 case before the Supreme Court, the opinion mentions an informer's privilege, which it defines as “the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). In that case the Government refused to disclose the identity of an informant, but the Court ruled that there is a “limitation on the applicability of the privilege [that] arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Roviaro at 61. Likewise, in 1974 the Supreme Court had to decide whether “the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege.” United States v. Nixon, President of the United States, et al., 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The Court concluded “that the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege,” Nixon at 707, and therefore “this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law.” Nixon at 708.

With just these two examples, it should be clear that privilege is an ambiguous term. Let’s see what confidentiality is, then, to give each one of these a proper context. The legal dictionary online defines confidentiality as “the keeping of another person or entity’s information private.” Rule 16 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides other exceptions. “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,” but also provides that “[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client … to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm …  to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud,” and several other conditions. 


As judiciary interpreters, our principal concern is the confidential communication we interpret between parties to a lawsuit or a criminal prosecution. We know that everything we do in our professional capacity is presumed to be private and confidential, except when there is a record available for public inspection. This should be our rule of thumb: if we are ordered by a judge to disclose information we acquired during an interpreted event, we follow the judge’s lead and comply. A judge will know whether the information is or is not privileged. Otherwise, we keep everything to ourselves. Remember that a secret shared is no longer a secret.


Keep the Conversation Going


If this topic resonated with you, be sure to check out our previous blog posts for more insights on the realities of our profession, and the evolving world of judiciary translation and interpreting:


Join the Conversation — A quick guide to commenting on The NAJIT Observer 

When Preparation Is a Matter of Respect: Interpreting Victim Impact Statements — What happens when preparation becomes not just part of the job, but a matter of respect?

Do Not Judge Lest You Be Judged — What can we do to make sure practitioners have access to the needed information to establish fees that work for them?  
The 99% Show Rate: How Process and Relationships Solve the No-Show Problem — What processes and relationships can help agencies and interpreters prevent no-shows?        


You can find these and more in our blog archives!


Interested in sharing your insights with our community? 

Check out Writing for The NAJIT Observer to learn how you can contribute.


Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this post are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position, policies, or views of the NAJIT Board of Directors or the organization as a whole. Content published in The NAJIT Observer is intended to encourage professional dialogue, reflection, and community engagement. Reader discretion is advised where topics may involve complex ethical, professional, or emotionally sensitive subject matter.


Janis Palma, PhD

Guest Contributor


Janis Palma, PhD is a professional English-Spanish interpreter and translator with over 43 years of experience working as both staff and independent contractor in state and federal courts, as well as for private clients in conferences on a broad spectrum of topics. She is certified by NAJIT, the U.S. Courts, and is a Texas Master licensed interpreter. She holds a Ph.D. in Language Studies, a Master’s in Legal Studies (MLS), and an M.A. in Caribbean History and Literature. Janis Palma has been a volunteer with the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators (NAJIT) since 1986 and was awarded a Life Membership in 2006. She has presented at conferences, taught, written, and published extensively on subjects related to interpreting, language access, and language rights. Her research interests are mainly focused on the intersection between language, law, and interpreting in legal contexts. She is currently working towards a second PhD in Rhetorics, Communication and Information Design from Clemson University, where she plans to develop a new line of research into the rhetorics of justice and language access in the United States.

We love to hear from our readers! If you wish to make a comment on this blog post, please use the comment box on the page below the post.

Categories

Archives

Select Month

The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of NAJIT.

Recent Posts
By Alexandra Kaplan September 2, 2026
The 99% Show Rate: How Process and Relationships Solve the No-Show Problem
By Hilda Zavala-Shymanik August 27, 2026
Do Not Judge Lest You Be Judged
By Cecilia Moreira August 21, 2026
When Preparation Is a Matter of Respect – Interpreting Victim Impact Statements
Show More